Peace Theories and the Balkan War by Angell, Norman - CHAPTER I.

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Peace Theories and the Balkan War

CHAPTER I.

THE QUES­TIONS AND THEIR AN­SWER.

What has Paci­fism, Old or New, to say now?

Is War im­pos­si­ble?

Is it un­like­ly?

Is it fu­tile?

Is not force a rem­edy, and at times the on­ly rem­edy?

Could any rem­edy have been de­vised on the whole so con­clu­sive and com­plete as that used by the Balkan peo­ples?

Have not the Balkan peo­ples re­deemed War from the charges too read­ily brought against it as sim­ply an in­stru­ment of bar­barism?

Have ques­tions of prof­it and loss, eco­nom­ic con­sid­er­ations, any­thing what­ev­er to do with this war?

Would the demon­stra­tion of its eco­nom­ic fu­til­ity have kept the peace?

Are the­ories and log­ic of the slight­est use, since force alone can de­ter­mine the is­sue?

Is not war there­fore in­evitable, and must we not pre­pare dili­gent­ly for it? I will an­swer all these ques­tions quite sim­ply and di­rect­ly with­out ca­su­istry and log­ic-​chop­ping, and hon­est­ly de­sir­ing to avoid para­dox and “clev­er­ness.” And these quite sim­ple an­swers will not be in con­tra­dic­tion with any­thing that I have writ­ten, nor will they in­val­idate any of the prin­ci­ples I have at­tempt­ed to ex­plain.

And my an­swers may be sum­marised thus:--

(1) This war has jus­ti­fied both the Old Paci­fism and the New. By uni­ver­sal ad­mis­sion events have proved that the Paci­fists who op­posed the Crimean War were right and their op­po­nents wrong. Had pub­lic opin­ion giv­en more con­sid­er­ation to those Paci­fist prin­ci­ples, this coun­try would not have “backed the wrong horse,” and this war, two wars which have pre­ced­ed it, and many of the abom­ina­tions of which the Balkan penin­su­lar has been the scene dur­ing the last 60 years might have been avoid­ed, and in any case Great Britain would not now car­ry up­on her shoul­ders the re­spon­si­bil­ity of hav­ing dur­ing half a cen­tu­ry sup­port­ed the Turk against the Chris­tian and of hav­ing tried use­less­ly to pre­vent what has now tak­en place--the break-​up of the Turk's rule in Eu­rope.

(2) War is not im­pos­si­ble, and no re­spon­si­ble Paci­fist ev­er said it was; it is not the like­li­hood of war which is the il­lu­sion, but its ben­efits.

(3) It is like­ly or un­like­ly ac­cord­ing as the par­ties to a dis­pute are guid­ed by wis­dom or fol­ly.

(4) It _is_ fu­tile; and force is no rem­edy.

(5) Its fu­til­ity is proven by the war waged dai­ly by the Turks as con­querors, dur­ing the last 400 years. And be­cause the Balkan peo­ples have cho­sen the less evil of two kinds of war, and will use their vic­to­ry to bring a sys­tem based on force and con­quest to an end, we who do not be­lieve in force and con­quest re­joice in their ac­tion, and be­lieve it will achieve im­mense ben­efits. But if in­stead of us­ing their vic­to­ry to elim­inate force, they in their turn pin their faith to it, con­tin­ue to use it the one against the oth­er, ex­ploit­ing by its means the pop­ula­tions they rule, and be­come not the or­gan­is­ers of so­cial co-​op­er­ation among the Balkan pop­ula­tions, but mere­ly, like the Turks, their con­querors and “own­ers,” then they in their turn will share the fate of the Turk.

(6) The fun­da­men­tal caus­es of this war are eco­nom­ic in the nar­row­er, as well as in the larg­er sense of the term; in the first be­cause con­quest was the Turk's on­ly trade--he de­sired to live out of tax­es wrung from a con­quered peo­ple, to ex­ploit them as a means of liveli­hood, and this con­cep­tion was at the bot­tom of most of Turk­ish mis­gov­ern­ment. And in the larg­er sense its cause is eco­nom­ic be­cause in the Balka­ns, re­mote ge­ograph­ical­ly from the main drift of Eu­ro­pean eco­nom­ic de­vel­op­ment, there has not grown up that in­ter­de­pen­dent so­cial life, the in­nu­mer­able con­tacts which in the rest of Eu­rope have done so much to at­ten­uate prim­itive re­li­gious and racial ha­treds.

(7) A bet­ter un­der­stand­ing by the Turk of the re­al na­ture of civilised gov­ern­ment, of the eco­nom­ic fu­til­ity of con­quest of the fact that a means of liveli­hood (an eco­nom­ic sys­tem), based up­on hav­ing more force than some­one else and us­ing it ruth­less­ly against him, is an im­pos­si­ble form of hu­man re­la­tion­ship bound to break down, _would_ have kept the peace.

(8) If Eu­ro­pean state­craft had not been an­imat­ed by false con­cep­tions, large­ly eco­nom­ic in ori­gin, based up­on a be­lief in the nec­es­sary ri­val­ry of states, the ad­van­tages of pre­pon­der­ant force and con­quest, the West­ern na­tions could have com­posed their quar­rels and end­ed the abom­ina­tions of the Balkan penin­su­la long ago--even in the opin­ion of the _Times_. And it is our own false state­craft--that of Great Britain--which has a large part of the re­spon­si­bil­ity for this fail­ure of Eu­ro­pean civil­isa­tion. It has caused us to sus­tain the Turk in Eu­rope, to fight a great and pop­ular war with that aim, and led us in­to treaties which had they been kept, would have obliged us to fight to-​day on the side of the Turk against the Balkan States.

(9) If by “the­ories” and “log­ic” is meant the dis­cus­sion of and in­ter­est in prin­ci­ples, the ideas that gov­ern hu­man re­la­tion­ship, they are the on­ly things that can pre­vent fu­ture wars, just as they were the on­ly things that brought re­li­gious wars to an end--a pre­pon­der­ant pow­er “im­pos­ing” peace play­ing no role there­in. Just as it was false re­li­gious the­ories which made the re­li­gious wars, so it is false po­lit­ical the­ories which make the po­lit­ical wars.

(10) War is on­ly in­evitable in the sense that oth­er forms of er­ror and pas­sion--re­li­gious per­se­cu­tion for in­stance--are in­evitable; they cease with bet­ter un­der­stand­ing, as the at­tempt to im­pose re­li­gious be­lief by force has ceased in Eu­rope.

(11) We should not pre­pare for war; we should pre­pare to pre­vent war; and though that prepa­ra­tion may in­clude bat­tle­ships and con­scrip­tion, those el­ements will quite ob­vi­ous­ly make the ten­sion and dan­ger greater un­less there is al­so a bet­ter Eu­ro­pean opin­ion.

These sum­marised replies need a lit­tle ex­pan­sion.